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In this article we develop a conceptualization of business ethics as practice. Starting
from the view that the ethics that organizations display in practice will have been forged
through an ongoing process of debate and contestation over moral choices, we examine
ethics in relation to the ambiguous, unpredictable, and subjective contexts of managerial
action. Furthermore, we examine how discursively constituted practice relates to
managerial subjectivity and the possibilities of managers being moral agents. The
article concludes by discussing how the ‘ethics as practice’ approach that we expound
provides theoretical resources for studying the diﬀerent ways that ethics manifest
themselves in organizations as well as providing a practical application of ethics in
organizations that goes beyond moralistic and legalistic approaches.
Introduction
In recent years, business scandals, ranging from
Enron to the Parmalat disasters, have once again
redirected the attention of both managers and
organization theorists to a consideration of ethics
and the moral dilemmas corporations face in the
context of contemporary capitalism (see Donald-
son, 2003; Johnson and Smith, 1999; Parker,
2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Soule, 2002;
Tonge, Greer and Lawton, 2003; Veiga, 2004;
Weaver, Trevin˜o and Cochran, 1999b; see also
Werhane, 2000). Despite such a renewed focus, as
Donaldson (2003) suggests, the theoretical tools
employed to analyse and understand ethics
require further development. In the same vein,
as Wicks and Freeman argue, ‘organization
studies needs to be fundamentally reshaped . . .
to provide room for ethics and to increase the
relevance of research’ (1998, p. 123). It is an aim
that we subscribe to. The goal of this article is to
develop a theoretical framework with which to
explore ethics in organization theory that moves
beyond being either prescriptive or morally
relative. To do so, we argue that ethics is best
understood and theorized as a form of practice.
Our approach is concerned with theorizing ethics
in relation to what managers actually do in their
everyday activities. We argue that such practice is
central to how ethical subjectivity is formed and
contested in organizations, as it is circumscribed
by organizational rules, norms and discourses.
It has long been recognized that the discipline of
organization studies needs to enlarge its role in
debating and discussing complex cases of ethics
(Saul, 1981; Zald, 1993). Continuing such discus-
sion is critical to the development of the ﬁeld
because ‘systematic attention to the moral dimen-
sion of business is necessary to a coherent and
constructive notion of organization studies’
(Wicks and Freeman, 1998). However, as Donald-
son argues ‘one problem preventing us from taking
ethics more seriously is a form of scientiﬁc naı¨vete´,
where we regard ethics as worse than ‘‘soft’’
because it lacks a theoretical foundation’ (2003,
p. 363) The theoretical disdain may occur because
ethics have been viewed as an extraneous incursion
from a moral realm outside ordinary practice and
orderly theory (Feldman, 2004), an incursion from
a transcendent and barely grasped tradition.
We approach ethics through a theoretical
framework focusing on how ethics play out in
practice, not pragmatically, but through an
emphasis on the context and interpretation of
ethics, the discourse in which they are enacted
and their relation to organizational subjects.
With this concept of ethics as practice we are
able to conceptualize the relations between: rule
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following and rule violation; the interplay be-
tween subjects and rule systems, and the active
and discursive construction of ethics and the
power such discourse exercises. We are aware of
the risks entailed in this approach and we will
seek to avoid them, especially the slander that the
position, like any postmodernism, is a form of
ethical relativism (Feldman, 2004). Rather than
stress the relativism of ethical practices, we
suggest that they will be conducted in a situation
of ethical pluralism, one in which moral choices
are made, often in unclear situations and against
potentially conﬂicting standards (see Bauman,
1993). We thus view ethics in organizations as an
ongoing process of debate and contestation over
moral choices – as Bauman argues, ‘being moral
means being bound to makes choices under
conditions of acute and painful uncertainty’
(Bauman and Tester, 2001, p. 46). In the suggested
ethics as practice framework, uncertainty and
‘bounded moral rationality’ (Donaldson and
Dunfee, 1994) are accounted for rather than being
replaced with an unwavering moralistic model
prescribing what organizations and their members
should do in order to be ‘ethical’, such as
subscribing to some transcendent notion of ‘tradi-
tion’ (Clegg and Feldman, 2005; Feldman, 2004).
In the next section we will situate ethics as a
key concern for management and organization
theory. Second, we describe our use of the
concept of practice and its focus on the way that
organizational members engage in ethical choices
and decisions facing ambiguous, unpredictable
and subjective contexts of action. Third, we
examine how ethical choices can be understood
as defying predetermination by ethical models,
rules or norms; ethics are both unpredictable and
future oriented. Fourth, we locate the practice of
ethics as situated within organizational discourse.
Then, we examine how ethics as practice relates
to managerial subjectivity. Lastly, we apply our
approach to the analysis of ethics in organiza-
tions and conclude by pointing to possible future
directions that the study of ethics as practice
might take.
Philosophy, ethics and the rule of
organizations
Philosophically, our approach originates with
Kant’s deontological ethics (see Kant, 1998, p.
30). Rather than deﬁning a set of values that
should guide action, Kant developed a process
that could be employed to prove whether an
action is ethical or not. He does this with the idea
of the categorical imperative, proposing that one
‘act only on that maxim whereby you can at
the same time will that it should be a universal
law’. The categorical imperative is not intended
to provide any speciﬁc ethical values but a
process by which anyone, anytime, anywhere,
can verify their action as ethically sound.
We agree that a deontological ethics is important
in that it marks an important step away from
an ethics based on certain and predetermined
values. However, such an ethics based on duty
does not take into account the changing socially
and discursively constituted environments in
which people enact their sense of duty. As Byers
argues, the categorical imperative can also be
taken as a case where ‘given the inﬁnite particu-
larity of the situations from which the maxim is
generated, the range of maxims subjected to
universalization is itself inﬁnite’ (in Byers and
Rhodes, 2004, p. 159).
In organization studies, researchers have
sought to determine whether ethics is an indivi-
dual or an organizational issue. Opinions vary;
some researchers argue that ethics is a funda-
mentally individual responsibility (Ibarra-Cola-
da, 2002; Soares, 2003; Watson, 2003), whereas
others insist that ethics is guaranteed in and
through bureaucratic structures (du Gay, 2000,
2004). We align ourselves, broadly, with those
social scientists, such as Gilligan, who focus on
ethics not as a matter of the ‘moral agent acting
alone on the basis of his [sic] principles’ (Gilligan,
1987, p. 304); we see morality as grounded in the
‘daily experiences and moral problems of real
people in their everyday life’ (Tronto, 1993, p. 79)
where the ethical maxim cannot be generalized
beyond the particularity of the situation. In
relation to business ethics this suggests ‘a need
to recognize the complexity and disorder of real-
life management practice and adopt methods of
investigation and theoretical and conceptual
frameworks that allow for this’ (Bartlett, 2003,
p. 233; see also Maclagan, 1995). As Bauman
puts it, ‘in the face of moral dilemmas without
good (let alone obvious) choices’, we recognize
the ‘excruciating diﬃculty of being moral’ (Bau-
man, 1993, p. 248). It is the practical aspects of
such complex ethical processes that we see as
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critical to understanding the lived reality of ethics
in organizations.
A key point of contestation deﬁning the
‘excruciating diﬃculty of being moral’, one that
cuts across the body of literature(s) on business
ethics, is the question of whether ethics and
organizational practice are, or can be, aligned in
the pursuit of business goals such as proﬁtability,
competitive advantage and so forth (Francis and
Armstrong, 2003; Jones, 1995; Joyner and Payne,
2002; Raiborn and Payne, 1996). Such issues date
back to Adam Smith’s (1863) argument that
maximizing personal advantage will lead,
through the mechanism of self-interested actors
competing in the market, to a maximum of
collectively beneﬁcial outcomes. Marx (1976) had
a clear rebuttal of such views through his
extension of Ricardo’s (1969) labour theory of
value, which critical approaches to ethics in
organizations have followed in questioning the
possibility of essentially exploitative proﬁt-seek-
ing organizations being able to be ethical (Jones,
2003; Stormer, 2003). Nonetheless, as a basis for
further enquiry neither blanket condemnation of
all organizations as amoral because of the form
of life of the economy and society that constitutes
them, nor as moral when they are composed only
of exemplary ideal agents, seems useful. Each
view tends to close oﬀ enquiry through an excess
of philosophical idealism and a lack of realism,
rather than open it up.
In realist terms, it is still widely recognized
empirically that the most common action for-
mally taken by organizations to deal with ethical
issues is the development and implementation of
ethical rules through codes of conduct and values
statements (Jackson, 2000; Kjonstad and Will-
mott, 1995; Stevens, 1994; ten Bos, 1997; Warren,
1993; Weaver, Trevin˜o and Cochran, 1999a),
together with the appointment of ‘ethics oﬃcers’
who design and enforce them (Donaldson, 2003).
Indeed, it is reported that 78% of the US top
1000 companies have a code of conducts (Nijhof
et al., 2003). Such contemporary discussion of
rules and translation of ethics into practice
derives from the modernist premise that universal
moral codes can and should be applied to social
groups in order to judge and foster ethical
conduct (Bauman, 1993). Such a conception of
ethics often not only informs organizational
practice but is also prevalent in research meth-
odologies based on the precept that the various
actions of managers and organizations can be
scrutinized by an observer in order to determine
whether they are ethical or not (e.g. Brass,
Butterﬁeld and Skaggs, 1998; Gatewood and
Carroll, 1991; Lewicki and Robinson, 1998;
Schweitzer, Ordonez and Douma, 2004). Such
conceptions rest on a theoretical normativism
that assumes that the ethical distinction between
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ can be codiﬁed and then
applied in order to ascertain whether certain
actions or behaviours are deemed ethical or
unethical. There is a rule, and things ether fall
within or outwith the rule. The observer passes
judgement from a safe distance of presumed
impartiality, a position which is ‘condemned to
see all practice as a spectacle’ by excluding ‘the
question of the (particular) conditions making
experience possible’ (Bourdieu 1997, pp. 1, 3).
Understanding ethics as practice
In contrast to normative, moralistic conceptions
of ethics, there is an emerging body of literature
that recognizes that ethics will always be situated
and contextual in character (Andrews, 1989;
Jackall, 1988; Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995;
Paine, 1994; ten Bos, 1997). For instance, Victor
and Cullen (1988) found in their empirical study
that ethical climate is determined by contextual
factors, including the wider sociocultural envir-
onment, the organizational form and the speciﬁc
history of an organization. Other researchers,
including Kjonstad and Willmott (1995), Ros-
souw and Vuuren (2003) and ten Bos and
Willmott (2001), make a similar point that while
the prescription of moral norms may ensure
compliance it does not guarantee morally sound
behaviour.
The work of Bauman helps to theorize ethics
beyond such rule-based approaches. As he
argues, ‘being moral means knowing that things
may be good or bad. But it does not mean
knowing, let alone knowing for sure, which
things are good and which things are bad’
(Bauman and Tester, 2001, p. 46). What this
suggests is that ethics will be enacted in situations
of ambiguity where dilemmas and problems will
be dealt with without the comfort of consensus or
certitude. Indeed, if making decisions and taking
actions were merely a matter of applying a simple
calculation or process then it could hardly be said
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that a person would have undergone any of the
deliberations or anxieties that accompany the
acceptance of ethical responsibility for diﬃcult
decisions (Derrida, 1992). Non-trivial ethics defy
codiﬁcation as ‘looking up the rule for the case
and applying the rule [as] a matter of adminis-
tration rather than ethics. Ethics begins where the
case does not exactly correspond to any rule, and
where the decision has to be taken without
subsumption’ (Bennington, 2000, p. 15; see also
Munro, 1992). The study of ethics needs to
account for real organizational issues (Stark,
1993) in all of their complexity, ambiguity and
perspectivality. The reality of lived experience
deﬁes easy conceptualization as a series of
rational, cognitive choices (Ellis and Flaherty,
1992). As we know, much organizational action
is framed by incomplete information, bounded
rationality, and messy, ‘garbage can’ decision-
making processes (Cohen, March and Olsen,
1972). Confronted with such complexities, an
incompatibility between ethical certainty and
business reality seems unavoidable – when such
a certainty is invoked, it can be expected to be
less about ethics and more about ‘a promise of
freedom from moral anxiety when in fact it is that
anxiety that is the substance of morality’ (Bau-
man, 1993, p. 80). The result is that ethics can
appear incommensurable with management prac-
tice (Jackson, 2000; Stark, 1993) understood not
as following predeﬁned judgements but as dy-
namic real-time interaction in relation to local,
culture-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc contexts
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994).
Given these dynamics of interaction, the
breadth of possible business contexts, the ambi-
guity of everyday life situations and ‘bounded
moral rationality’ (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994),
if there is anything that we can claim to know
with any certainty about ethics it is that they are
always subject to contestation. In recognizing the
complexity of ethics in practice it is Jackall (1988)
who has perhaps gone furthest in analysing ethics
in the context of everyday business. Jackall’s
approach was to research the occupational ethics
of managers in terms of the ‘moral rules-in-use
that managers construct to guide their behavior
at work’ (1988, p. 4). As he argues,
What matters on a day-to-day basis are the moral
rules-in-use fashioned within the personal and
structural constraints of one’s organization. As it
happens, these rules may vary sharply depending on
various factors, such as proximity to the market,
line or staﬀ responsibilities, or one’s position in the
hierarchy. Actual organizational moralities are thus
contextual, situational, highly speciﬁc, and, most
often, unarticulated. (Jackall, 1988, p. 6)
Jackall’s research is broadly consistent with the
turn towards a practice perspective on orga-
nizations (see Ortner, 1984; Reckwitz, 2002;
Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and von Savigny, 2001)
and stresses the contextual and situational fac-
tors that shape ethics in organizations. Recently,
management scholars have applied this practice
perspective to ﬁelds such as strategy (Chia, 2004;
Jarzabkowski, 2004; Mintzberg, 1973; Samra-
Fredericks, 2003; Whittington, 1996). More
generally, such a concept of practice has its ante-
cedents in sociology (Garﬁnkel, 1967; Schu¨tz,
1967) and philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1968). Re-
cent social theorists such as Foucault (1977) and
Bourdieu (1997) also address practice explicitly.
A practice focus can be applied to the study of
ethics in organizations (see Andrews, 1989; Kjon-
stad and Willmott, 1995; Munro, 1992; Stevens,
1994; Paine, 1994; ten Bos, 1997; Warren, 1993).
Rather than prescribing a particular set of
values, a practice approach to ethics echoes the
Kantian interest in the condition of the possibi-
lities of ethical conduct. Rather than prescribing
essentialist positions, the ethics as practice
approach asks what people actually do when
they engage with ethics at work. We thus suggest
the need to understand ethics as practices that
constitute realities – including ethical realities
(Keleman and Peltonen, 2001). Our attention to
practice echoes Czarniawska’s (2001, 2003) con-
cern, following (Bourdieu, 1990), with the way
that the abstract and formally logical character of
theory does not adequately account for the
concrete, discursively incomplete, and somewhat
incoherent ways practice is conducted. Czar-
niawska suggests that practice is best understood
in terms of how:
[I]t creates its own rules in each instance of its use; it
favours verbs over nouns; it focuses on relation-
ships rather than attributes and it employs perfor-
mative deﬁnitions, which means that the
understanding of things depends on their use
(Czarniawska, 2001, p. 256)
The logic of science prizes organizational cer-
tainty and control of knowledge in place of
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ambiguity and spontaneity: that way points to
prediction and an interest in control. A focus on
practice allows one to embrace the active,
unpredictable, subjective and not fully control-
led ways that organizations operate (Czarniaws-
ka, 2003), in an interest more oriented to
interpretative understanding (Habermas, 1973).
In terms of practice, it is in human action that we
ﬁnd structure reproduced; however, such repro-
duction is never simply or totally achieved
(Giddens, 1984). In this way, an ‘ethics as
practice’ approach directs attention not towards
models that deﬁne, predict or judge ethics in and
of themselves, but rather towards an examination
of how ethics are diﬀerentially embedded in
practices that operate in an active and contex-
tualized manner. If we follow Giddens, that
social action occurs in the relationship between
structure and agency, then it follows that
action ‘cannot be understood or signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced without addressing the context within
which they are formulated’ (Dillard and Yuthas,
2002, p. 51).
In pursuing such an approach, it is important
to consider the relation between notions of
morality and ethics. Following Bauman (Bau-
man, 1993, 1995; Bauman and Tester, 2001)
morality concerns choice ﬁrst of all – it is the
predicament that human beings encounter where
they can or must make a selection amongst
various possibilities. On the basis of those choices
they deem what is likely to be ‘good’ or ‘right’, or
‘bad’ or ‘wrong’. Morality emerges from the
realization of the ‘primary condition of knowing
that things could be diﬀerent from what they are’
and that as moral beings people are ‘bound to
make choices under conditions of acute and
painful uncertainty’ (Bauman in Bauman and
Tester, 2001, pp. 44, 46). As Lukes (1974, 2005)
argues, the exercise of power, making a diﬀer-
ence, always involves moral responsibility (see
also Luka´cs, 1972; Nietzsche, 1969). It is in such
recognition of diﬀerent futures that people can
realize that their actions and choices may be good
or bad, rather than merely leading where the past
predicts. In relation to such a morality, ethics can
be understood in social terms where ‘society
engraves the pattern of ethics upon the raw and
pliable stuﬀ of morality’ (Bauman and Tester,
2001, p. 45).
We understand ethics as the social organizing
of morality; the process by which accepted (and
contested) models are ﬁxed and reﬁxed, by which
morality becomes ingrained in various customary
ways of doing things. Ethics is a practice of
choice and evaluation circumscribed by socially
established ethical models that never fully
guide moral conduct; the reasons are threefold.
First, where a person’s actions are fully deter-
mined by predeﬁned external criteria then moral
agency is denied to that person, even if that
agency is only directed towards the choice of one
model over another. Second, in practice people
encounter a plurality of ethical models for
conduct that are not necessarily consistent with
each other, such that to follow one model might
always be a means of disregarding another.
Third, amidst the volatility of practice, novel
situations can never entirely be predicted or
captured by the model: some interpretation is
always required in order to make decisions about
moral conduct. Together this suggests that in
practice there will always be (at least) a residue of
moral agency.
Ethics beyond predetermination
When a member of an organization faces a novel
and morally charged situation s/he does more
than merely apply a formulaic model or process
in order to decide on a course of action. Indeed,
from the perspective that we are describing,
such predetermination is anathema to a real
sense of ethics because it fails to account for the
choices and dilemmas that are central to its
practice. The dynamics of practice imply that
future oriented action cannot wholly be deter-
mined by the past. It is in this moment of
‘undecidability’ that ethical responsibility can
be located – a moment that exceeds rational
calculation (Derrida, 1992; Jones, 2003). The
issue, from a practice perspective, is to investigate
how various ethical models and calculations are
used in relation to the activities of organizing
and managing. Thus, organizational members
have to make choices to apply, interpret and
make sense of various competing models of
practice (including ethical ones) in speciﬁc situa-
tions. Choice does not suggest a total ‘free play’
with regard to ethics, but implies that moral
choice proposes an oscillation between possibi-
lities, where these possibilities are determined
situationally.
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Munro has shown that it is competition
between precepts that characterizes ethical situa-
tions as dilemmas. He argues the ‘very nature of
moral dilemmas is that they arise from the
existing norms of behaviour, which sometimes
demand contradictory things of a person’ (1992,
p. 102). Two diﬀerent norms, both claiming
sovereignty over ethics in their own context of
application, may clash when enacted together.
Predetermined ethical systems cannot account for
these ethical dilemmas, since it is the way that
they relate to each other in practice that creates
the dilemma (Wittgenstein, 1968).1 Ethics are
at stake when these norms, rules or systems of
ethics clash – and no third meta-rule can be
applied to resolve the dilemma. As Munro
concludes, ‘codes are almost useless to individual
employees who are faced with . . . particular
dilemmas’ (1992, p. 105; see also Letiche, 1998;
Willmott, 1998). Rather, ethical decisions emerge
out of dilemmas that cannot be managed in
advance through rules. Thus, ruling is an activity
whereby the dynamic relationship between rules
and their enactment becomes the focal point of
inquiry. Looking at the relation and translation
between rules and the use of rules opens up an
analytical space in which ethics as practice
becomes visible (Dean, 1999). However, this does
not mean that codes and ethical rules become
obsolete.
Ethical codes, norms and models have impor-
tant implications for organizational members.
While they do not determine practice they are
important because they guide the enactments of
subjects who exercise some degree of freedom in
governing their own conduct. They become
instruments that skilful and knowledgeable
members can engage and play with freely in their
everyday management of their own and others’
aﬀairs. As Foucault suggests, ‘what is ethics, if
not the practice of freedom, the conscious
practice of freedom?’ (1997, p. 284). In this sense,
freedom is manifest precisely when one does not
unconsciously or mechanistically follow rules
without reﬂection and deliberation. The moral
agent is one who enacts agency rather than one
whose actions are considered to be wholly
determined structurally (see Lukes, 1974). One
may agree or disagree with particular ethical
dictates, but it is what one does in relation to
them that determines the practice of ethics. For
instance, it is clear that, despite sustained claims
regarding the unjust treatment of women in the
workforce, equal employment opportunity
(EEO) legislation has not been suﬃcient to gain
women equal status in organizations. A simplistic
view would suggest that this should not have
been the case – the rules should be implemented
and complied with so as to produce the desired
eﬀects, including the realization of a more ethical
and just state of aﬀairs. While EEO is not
pointless, in practice, discrimination remains
enacted through tacit cultural micropractices of
everyday organizational life that it does not reach
(see Martin, 2000; Meyerson and Kolb, 2001).
Such practices emerge from the relation between
explicit EEO pronouncements, the enactment of
gender in organizations, and the power and
agency of those people who interact in order to
produce gender inequality. Ethics are located in
culturally embedded and context-driven enact-
ment (Thorne and Saunders, 2002).
Codes play an important organizational role.
Following Meyer and Rowan (1977), when
formal systems of ethics are present, such as
codes of conduct, they can be expected to
function as ceremonially adopted myths used
to gain legitimacy, resources, stability, and to
enhance survival prospects. The practice of the
system far exceeds its explicit statements. Thus,
to maintain ceremonial conformity, ‘organiza-
tions that reﬂect institutional rules tend to buﬀer
their formal structures from the uncertainties of
technical activities by becoming loosely coupled,
building gaps between their formal structures and
actual work activities’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977,
p. 340). In their search for legitimacy, organiza-
tions use codes of conduct as standards to justify
what they do (Brunsson et al., 2000) as well as to
fulﬁl a narcissistic obsession with looking ‘good’
1To take a business example: a company that produces
pharmaceuticals may be committed to environmental
values as well as to helping Third World countries. Each
rule seems ethical and ‘good’ in itself but what if they
clash? Management has at least two options: either
producing at lower cost in less environmentally friendly
ways and thus being able to distribute a new medicine
much less expensively in Third World countries, or
manufacturing according to high environmental stan-
dards and selling the medication at a higher price. In the
second option, the environment is respected, but the
limited economic resources of poor patients are not,
meaning that many people who need the medicine will
be excluded from using it.
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(Roberts, 2001, 2003). In this sense, codes of
conduct become a ‘public relations exercise’
(Munro, 1992, p. 98). Take the example of
Enron, a company that won prizes for its ethics
programme, albeit that it was a programme
designed more for impression management than
ethical thoughtfulness (Sims and Brinkmann,
2003). Such impression management practices
might contribute to organizational legitimacy
(Suchman, 1995) but not necessarily to the form
of deliberation, decision and exercise of freedom
that characterizes ethically charged organiza-
tional problems.
What needs to be investigated is how people
adhere to, violate, ignore or creatively interpret
formally and culturally ethical precepts such as
may be contained in codes. From our perspective,
it is not that codes produce people’s social actions
but that skilled social actors will from time-to-
time use codes to accomplish those actions that
they seek to bring oﬀ. Organizational members
engage with such formulations as a potential
instrument of power that can be used to
legitimize one’s own and delegitimize another’s
standpoint in power relations. Codes oﬀer no
guarantees: compliance can lead to ethically
questionable outcomes because there are no
guarantees of the ethicality of rules because they
are rules – if that was the case then the Eichmann
defence would not have the notoriety that it has
(Arendt, 1994). Therefore, interpreting and
adapting rules and maxims according to local
circumstances, including sometimes even contra-
vening them, might be deemed ethically sound.
Where some approaches consider ruling as a
means of governing (or trying to govern) ethical
activity by prescribing to other people what they
should and should not do, ethics as practice shifts
focus to how formal and informal rules are
enacted, how they are implemented and made
practical. Rules are resources to legitimize and to
negotiate organizational realities; ethics as prac-
tice focuses on the use of these resources rather
than on their static nature.
Ethics and discourse
The ethics as practice approach proposes a strong
link between ethics and their enactment in and
through discourse. In particular we understand
discourse, following Foucault (1972), as the taken
for granted ways that people are collectively able
to make sense of experience. Discourse cate-
gorizes experience by dividing it into meaningful
units. Such divisions, however, are ‘always
themselves reﬂexive categories, principles of
classiﬁcation, normative rules, institutionalized
types; they, in turn are facts of discourse . . . [that]
. . . have complex relations with each other, but
they are not intrinsic, autochthonous, and uni-
versally recognizable characteristics’ (Foucault,
1972, p. 22). Discourses provide the means with
which reality, including ethical reality, can be
understood – each is ‘a framework and a logic of
reasoning that, through its penetration of social
practice, systematically forms its objects’ (Alves-
son and Skoldberg, 2000, p. 224). It is such
frameworks that become instantiated in both
written and spoken as well as verbal and non-
verbally communicated texts that are constitutive
of organizational social realities (see Keenoy,
Oswick and Grant, 1997; Putnam, Phillips and
Chapman, 1996). Discourse is central to the
social construction of reality and the negotiation
of meaning in local contexts – it provides the
means through which experience is ordered and
sense is made (Grant et al., 2004; Weick, 1995).
Furthermore, discourse is a powerful way
through which social reality is shaped – an
enactment of power that can be constraining as
well as enabling (Foucault, 1977; Mumby, 1987;
Oakes, Townley and Cooper, 1998).
Just as any other form of practice, ethics are
enacted through, and require as their precondi-
tion, a discourse that provides patterned ways of
understanding and dealing with possible choices
and decisions. The relation between ethics and
the discourses that enact them in various contexts
is critical. Accordingly, an ethics as practice
perspective would consider the impact of the
discursive organization of ethical knowledge on
decision-making processes and moral judgements
that label action and consequences in terms of
their ethicality. Ethics as practice focuses on the
discourses that make sense of behaviour and
often retrospectively categorize practices as more
or less ethical, where discourse is considered as a
resource that legitimizes behaviour and con-
structs frameworks (including vocabulary) to
justify practices.
Ethics become a means through which people
in organizations deﬁne situations and decisions
by applying socially derived value judgements to
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them, enabling them to judge their relative
‘goodness’. Studying ethics in business can be
recast as a concern with understanding the
diﬀerent discursive frameworks that people in
organizations draw on in order to make value
judgements and decisions. Discourse provides the
means through which ethical sensemaking can
occur. In Weick’s (1995) terms, sensemaking
concerns invention rather more than discovery
in its constructions, ﬁltering, framing and crea-
tion of facticity. It is these that make intersub-
jective realities materially tangible. Ethics can be
seen in overarching discourses that make sense of
organizational phenomena; as the good, the bad,
and the ugly; the moral, shameful or lewd, or that
which is just or unjust and so forth. To under-
stand the ethics of an organization is to under-
stand how its members use categorization devices
(Sacks, 1972) and how such discursive formula-
tions frame judgements.
The ethical discourses that circulate in and
around organizations can be expected to be
multiple, often contradictory, and likely to
change with the viewpoint of whatever reﬂective
glance enacts their occasioned use. The accounts
that circulate in meetings can take on a very
diﬀerent meaning when called to account in
subsequent juridical enquiries, for instance. The
focus on discourse is not intended to be opposed
to one on behaviour – indeed, discourse consti-
tutes the frame within which behaviour can be
conceived as action that is more or less ethical or
unethical in the ﬁrst place. Ethical problems and
unethical action do not exist per se but are
enacted in and through discursive processes of
sensemaking. To call behaviour unethical is
already to have categorized it as a piece of social
action; to call behaviour unethical implies a
discursively deﬁned set of values. The deﬁnition
of what is good and bad becomes the focus of
analysis rather then the judgmental act of
agreeing or disagreeing. For instance, Nick
Leeson, who was held responsible for the collapse
of Barings Bank, worked in an environment in
which his actions and his behaviour were
discursively tolerated and encouraged. Only after
his fraud was discovered and new data formed
a diﬀerent narrative of Leeson as an irrespon-
sible gambler did the judgements about his
behaviour rapidly change. In this case, his risk-
taking attitude was ﬁrst discursively made sense
of as innovative, competitive and timely; later it
was framed as irresponsible (see Drummond,
2002).2
How do discourses provide the preconditions
or justiﬁcations for possible ethical determina-
tions and how do diﬀerent discourses constitute
these judgements? How do people work within
and between such discourses in formulating their
ethical practice? These are the issues for a
practice-based approach. Discourses provide
diﬀerent possibilities, diﬀerent determinations,
for ethical action in situated contexts, albeit with
some being more dominant and powerful than
others, but, as we have been at pains to point out,
they do not wholly determine practice. Thus,
understanding ethics as practice implies analysing
those discourses that enact particular ethical
attributions in relation to concrete practices and
actions.
Rather than judging whether a given behaviour
is ethical or not, from an a priori standpoint, we
suggest understanding those discourses that
nurture what are taken to be ethical sensemaking
processes in speciﬁc situations, thus creating the
conditions of possibility for notions of ethics to
be applied in the constitution of particular types
of social action (Schu¨tz, 1967). Considering ethics
as practice requires an analysis of those dis-
courses that frame situated judgements: in
particular, the ways in which those actions
deemed ethical or unethical are the result of
2The ethical import of discourse can be brieﬂy illustrated
at the macro and institutional level through looking at
broad historical changes concerning what has been seen
to constitute a ‘good’ worker. In the 1950s, the type of
employee who was valorized was the ‘organization man’
(Whyte, 1956). What Whyte identiﬁed in post-war
American work was a situation where managers were
increasingly beholden to a social ethic of conformity,
servitude and scientism, appropriate for belonging to a
paternal organization. More recently it has been argued
that this social ethic has been replaced as a result of
enterprise culture and discourses of excellence. The
discursive shift is from bureaucratic to entrepreneurial
styles of management. In this new order, the ideal
worker is an enterprising person who actively works to
pursue organizational goals through a ‘judicious mixture
of centralised control and individual autonomy’ (du
Gay, 1996, p. 61). In each case discourse constitutes the
nature of work and its ethics in a diﬀerent way – it
creates diﬀerent justiﬁcations and legitimations of what
actions can be deﬁned as being ‘good’. Indeed, du Gay’s
enterprising worker would be seen as anathema to
Whyte’s organizational man. The same action would be
judged ethically diﬀerent in these two diﬀerent discur-
sively constituted contexts.
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member’s categorization device as they are
applied in particular contexts (Sacks, 1972).
Furthermore, it requires an examination of the
ways such discourses change and leave traces in
subsequent discourses. Ethics always draw on
legitimatory discourses enacted through the
devices of categorization of membership and
action that are embedded in speciﬁc contexts.
The evaluation of behaviour as a speciﬁc type of
social action (whether it is ethical or not) is based
on discourse. Understanding this discourse and
analysing its reality-constituting power are ne-
cessary to understand ethics as practice.
Ethics and subjectivity
Drawing on Foucault’s (1977, 1997) conceptua-
lization of the relationship between subjectivity
and power, we consider the relation between
ethical discourse and the subjectivity of people at
work. Following Foucault (1972), discourse can
be understood as a dividing practice that seeks to
objectivize people into particular subject posi-
tions – categories that particular individuals
ascribe or seek. Thus, subject positions are
‘locations in social space from which certain
delimited agents can act. Subjects are socially
produced as individuals take up positions within
discourse’ (Hardy and Phillips, 2004, p. 302). In
this process ‘discourse is the principle means by
which organization members create a coherent
social reality that frames their sense of who they
are’ (Mumby and Clair, 1997, p. 181). Further-
more, it is people’s sense of ‘who they are’
through which they constitute themselves as
moral subjects of their actions while, at the same
time, being ‘disciplined’ by those very discourses
into being particular types of people (Foucault,
1990, 1977).
The key concern here is the way that those
ethical discourses in play in an organization give
rise to the possibility of various ethical subject
positions and the way these positions are taken
up (or resisted) by organizations’ stakeholders.
Organizational discourses contain within them
various ‘moral technologies’ (Foucault, 1977)
that attempt to govern the dispositions that make
up identity (Chan and Garrick, 2003) and
through which people can deﬁne their ethical
position in relation to their everyday practice
(Bernauer and Mahon, 1994; Keleman and
Peltonen, 2001; Sthyre, 2001). Discourse provides
the procedures ‘suggested or prescribed to
individuals in order to determine their identity,
maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain
number of ends, through relations of self-mastery
and self-knowledge’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 87).
A key part of this sees the moral predicament
faced by people in organizations as being about
the way that they bring morality to bear on their
interaction with organizational requirements (ten
Bos, 1997). In terms of subjectivity, ethics is
treated as a social phenomenon that people draw
on in order to deﬁne and defend who they are.
The crucial issue is that ethics as practice
concerns processes of self-formation amongst
people at work. The subjectivity of managers,
workers and other members is ethically consti-
tuted in recognizably appropriate ways; hence the
salutary morality of selecting poachers to be
gamekeepers – and the hard choices that poa-
chers turned gamekeepers have to make as they
cross the line from being outside the law to being
its keepers.
In Foucault’s (1984; see also Davidson, 1994)
understanding the ethical subjectivity that is
discursively dominant in an organization revolves
around the answers to four questions. First,
questions of ethical substance – which aspects of
organizational behaviour are considered to be
concerned with ethical judgement? Second, mode
of subjection – how do organization members
establish their relationships to ethical rules and
obligations? Third, practices of the self – what
practices do people in the organization engage in,
in order to be considered, not only by others but
also themselves, as ethical? Fourth, aspirations
for the self – what ethics of the idealized ‘self’ do
people in the organization aspire to? By examin-
ing how such questions are answered in particular
organizational settings, the ethical subjectivities
within an organization and the dominant dis-
courses that seek to deﬁne them become apparent.
As du Gay (2000) suggests, liberal forms of
managing and governing create social actors as
subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice
upon whom political institutions seek to act by
shaping and utilizing their freedom. The practice
of ethics links subjectivity and discourse on both
the organizational and the individual level. It is
not the free subject that simply chooses whether
to behave ethically, but the practice of ethics
that constitutes the subject. It is not a universal,
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a-contextual code of conduct that forms sub-
jectivity; rather it is embedded in day-to-day
practices and discourses (Keleman and Peltonen,
2001). How do people at work relate to and enact
organizational practices and how do those
practices construct their conduct and subjectiv-
ity? Ethics as practice answers these questions
through an analysis of what constitutes subjec-
tivity at work. It considers how people conduct
their own conduct and strive to conduct other
people’s conduct through organizational prac-
tices. By implication we can consider ethics in
terms of how it is linked to critical thought: it is
not about deﬁning values, rather it is a ‘historical
investigation into the events that have led us to
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as
subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying’
(Foucault, 1997, p. 315).
As Roberts (2001, 2003) has elaborated, a
consideration of ethics in relation to subjectivity
needs to be considered not as a narcissistic
concern with the self, but rather in terms of the
relation between self and other. He proposes the
constitution of ethical subjectivity as being in
primary and proximate relation to the other
rather than retaining a desire for the ‘fulﬁlment
of the fantasy of being a sovereign individual’
(Roberts, 2001, p. 119). Roberts follows Levinas’
(1991) contention that the primary site of ethics is
in the face-to-face relationship where one ac-
knowledges the very particularity of the other,
and realizes that it is only because of that other
that one can come to see one’s self as a self.
Importantly, this is not a relationship whereby
the other is subsumed into the self, but rather one
of ‘inﬁnite responsibility’ to the other – one who
can never be fully known in the intensity of their
own particularity and to whom one is responsible
without the expectation of reciprocity. For
Levinas, the relationship to the other is one of
hospitality and it is an attention to this hospital-
ity that is the beginning of ethics. As such, what
Roberts explains is how a consideration of
subjectivity in ethics needs to be heedful that
the ethical subject is not one that is foreclosed by
preoccupation with self but rather takes place in
terms of the self’s responsibility to others. As
Bauman puts it, the moral self is ‘constituted by
responsibility . . . [and] . . . answerability to the
Other and to moral self-conscience’ (1993, p. 11).
Roberts (2001, 2003) suggests the need to
diﬀerentiate between the notions of an ‘en-
crusted’, ‘reﬂexive’ self on the one hand and a
‘psyche’ that is the ‘soul of the other in me’ on the
other (Roberts, 2003, p. 252). In terms of
practice, we are less sanguine about making such
absolute diﬀerences between a socially deter-
mined self and one that is pre-social. What we do
take from this argument, however, is that ethics,
at least, involves a preparedness to resist power
relations that try to determine the self as merely
an object of power. While we do not agree that
beneath such a ‘crust’ there lays an unencrusted
kernel of ultimate responsibility, ethics will
involve subjects constituting action. Thus, we
acknowledge the presence of a discursively
constituted and reﬂexive ego, while also attesting
to how a ‘moral impulse’ (Bauman, 1993) or
‘sentience’ (Roberts, 2001) might temper subject-
determining discourse. Our position here, follow-
ing Foucault, is that a subject can constitute itself
in an active fashion through ‘practices of the self’
even when those practices, rather than being
invented by the individual, are ‘imposed upon
him [sic] by his culture, his society, and his social
group’ (1986, p. 291).
Putting practice into action
According to Handy (2002), 90% of all Amer-
icans do not trust managers to look after the
interests of their employees and only 18% think
that they look after their shareholders properly.
He argues that ‘those countries that boast most
stridently about their democratic principles de-
rive their wealth from institutions [i.e. business
organizations] that are deﬁciently undemocratic,
in which all serious power is held by outsiders
and power inside is wielded by a dictatorship or,
at best, an oligarchy’ (Handy, 2002, p. 52). In
such a context it seems that despite the prevalence
of talk of ethics, its practice is somewhat contra-
dictory. Ethics is an important issue for organi-
zations facing environments in which their
customers, clients, employees and other stake-
holders are clearly ethically sensitive. The ap-
proach to ethics that we are advocating in this
article is one that, while theoretically informed,
focuses speciﬁcally on what organization do
about ethics rather than just on abstract princi-
ples. Such a focus is not, however, crudely
pragmatic, but instead is one that emphasizes
the context and interpretation of ethics, the
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discourse in which they are enacted and their
relation to organizational subjects.
Focusing on ethics as lived practice instead of
as ‘a few good principles’ (Soule, 2002) enables
one to make the speciﬁc nature of ethics
(including ethical dilemmas) visible. Ethics as
practice allows for a theoretical approach that
examines how ethics actually are enacted and
how they constitute work. In this perspective,
ethical problems, dilemmas and mistakes are
central. Indeed, it is by reﬂecting on real
dilemmas, as social actors deﬁne them in social
actions, that we may arrive at a more substantive
appreciation of ethics in and of organizations.
There will be always a conﬂict of interests
between ethical values and, we suggest, such
conﬂict is central to ethical vibrancy. An organi-
zation that desires a centrally controlled ethics
will only stiﬂe the possibility of a reﬂected and
considered ethics. When ethics is something one
does rather than something one has, then this
‘doing’, organizationally, is enhanced by the
opportunity for debate, discussion and plurivocal
exchange and dialogue. The result is not unani-
mity with regard to ethics, but rather an ongoing
questioning of the adequacy of the organizations’
ethics in relation to the novel situations and
contexts in which it ﬁnds itself. It is in this way
that ethics can be enhanced by vigorous and
persistent self-critique, practised through open
dialogue and the creation of ethical spaces in
which such issues can be discussed. A considered
ethics is one that is never convinced of its own
ethicality and is practised in a way that ‘is always
haunted by the suspicion that it is not moral
enough’ (Bauman, 1993, p. 80).
As Bauman explores, however, such a ghostly
suspicion is one that organizations do not
necessarily embrace. As he writes: ‘the organiza-
tion’s answer to [the] autonomy of moral
behaviour is the heteronomy of instrumental
and procedural rationalities . . . actors are chal-
lenged to justify their conduct by reason as
deﬁned either by the approved goal or by the
rules of behaviour’ (1993, p. 124). It is in this way
that Bauman claims that all social organization
consists of ‘neutralizing the disruptive and de-
regulating impact of moral impulse’ (p. 125) and
renders social action to be morally adiaphoric –
a term he adopts to refer to that which is
morally indiﬀerent, such that it is measurable
only by technical, and not moral, criteria. The
adiaphoraization is achieved by ‘the removal of
the eﬀects of action beyond the reach of moral
limits’ (p. 125). Individuals are separated from
the intentions and eﬀects of their actions by a
series of mediators such that ones own job
appears as a relatively insigniﬁcant part of the
ﬁnal results. Thus, organizations ensure that
moral responsibility ‘ﬂoats’ above the individuals
within that organization, entailing that the actor
become morally responsible not for the overall
aims and outcomes (which are far away), but
rather responsible to the others in the action-
chain. Furthermore, the disassembling of the
object of moral action into traits means that
action is targeted on the traits rather than on the
whole person; thus, eﬀects on the whole person
are not considered as part of the intention,
leaving the action free from moral evaluation.
In this sense adiaphorization is achieved by
‘eﬀacing the face’ of the other such that those
others are disaggregated as persons to whom one
might be morally bound. On this basis, action
becomes rationalized and no longer subject to
irrational moral urges – a heteronomous sociali-
zation that works through norms and rules. Here,
obedience precludes interpersonal empathy.
Ethics as practice implies an openness to accept
and discuss ethical dilemmas that are eschewed
by adiaphorization. Thus, the acceptance and
discussion of ethical dilemmas is one step
towards more ethically informed management.
Instead of reducing practice to simple wrong-
right answers, we suggest ethics is ‘practised’
when ethical problems are made visible and
discussed as complex problems rather than as
problems that can be managed according to an
economic calculus.3
It should be evident that our approach does
not promote the (utopian) ideal of an ideal
speech situation (Habermas, 1973) in which all
ethical conﬂicts can be resolved. Rather, we want
to emphasis that ethics is always contested
3An example of this is Bagley’s (2003) ‘ethical decision
tree’. It is a business tool that exposes conﬂicts rather
than pretends to know their answers. In this sense, when
ethics is treated as a matter of the application of
premade rules, scenarios or values, the practice of ethics
in fact becomes stymied through an attempt to provide
shelter from the burden of responsibilities – the practice
of ethics is about opening up the diﬃcult moral issues
that are embodied in arduous dilemmas and conﬂicting
moral demands (Bauman, 1993).
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terrain: as Nietzsche (1969) has shown, ethics is
inextricably linked with power relations. The
suggested approach recognizes the contextuality
and contestation of ethics and dismisses an
essentialist approach based on a priori values.
Furthermore, this contestation must be regarded
not just as a form of debate over what is or is not
ethical, but also revolves around the contestation
of ethical subjectivity itself. Thus, a distinction
can be made between regarding the self as an
autonomous agent, the self as responsible to
others (Roberts, 2003, following Levinas) and the
self as produced by discourse.
A new research agenda
Our discussion poses previously unasked ques-
tions. These questions require both pragmatic
empirical and theoretical consideration (Wicks
and Freeman, 1998). The opportunity is to inves-
tigate how ethics works through practices that
are both explicitly governed and implicitly enac-
ted. Researchers and theorists need to know what
ethics are politically constructed in what ways in
organizations and how certain sorts of behaviour
are enacted and constituted as (un)ethical social
actions by practices of the organization, its
management, its employees and the broader
community. In this sense the ethical theorist is
an ‘interpreter’ rather than a ‘legislator’ (Bau-
man, 1987) of practice, with a concern for how
ethical systems come to bear on concrete prac-
tices of managing and decision-making, and how
the potentially diﬀerent ethical systems of diﬀer-
ent stakeholders interact with and, at times, come
into conﬂict with each other. To propose this is
not to endorse a slide into relativism: the fact that
moral values cannot be expressed as simple rules
of conduct increases, rather than decreases, the
importance of our ethical responsibilities. Trans-
cendent and transparent truths and absolute
values do elude organizational grasp in the heat
of the ethical moment. However, this does not
mean that we must forsake the cognitive cate-
gories and moral principles that we cannot live
without, such as right and wrong or equality and
justice. There are unavoidable limitations and
inherent contradictions in the ideas and norms
that guide our actions, and these need to be
recognized in such a way as to keep them open to
constant questioning and continual revision.
Drawing on Dean (1999) we can formulate a
research agenda for ethics as practice. First,
ethics as practice analyses the precise points when
a form of managing or acting becomes regarded
as problematic. It is less concerned about the
solutions that a certain way of organizing oﬀers
and more concerned with how behaviour is
turned into an ethical problem and people start
to question its legitimacy as a social action.
Which institutions, which discourses, which
interests collide or cohere when a way of
managing is called into question? In addressing
such questions an important consideration is to
study the role that oﬃcial and formal ethical
codes play. What eﬀects do they have on business
behaviour and practice in terms of how (poten-
tial) conﬂicts between formulated ethics, ascribed
social actions and actual behaviours are ad-
dressed and how is the gap between ethical codes,
social actions, and actual behaviour experienced
by organization members and other stake-
holders? As we have argued, ethical responsibility
can be seen to be a matter of reﬂection and choice
amongst undecidable alternatives: thus, research-
ing ethics can also relate to whether ethics is
experienced by people as a paradox and dilemma
between choice options, individual ethics, orga-
nizational requirements and environmental im-
peratives.
Second, instead of seeking to identify ‘who is
(un)ethical’, an approach to ethics as practice
would focus on the question of how organiza-
tions work in relation to ethics. It presupposes
that there is a range of diﬀerent elements involved
that transcend individual subjects. Thus, it
focuses on the complex heterogeneous web that
makes organizations work: the institutions, dis-
courses, agencies/agents, supporting technical
infrastructure and so on. The research questions
are whether operative ethical discourses are the
result of individual or management initiatives or
an expression of an organization’s cultures? Are
they imposed by the environment or by the
objects that shape, frame and are worked on in
that environment? How are such discourses
mediated and where are they embedded? And
how do diﬀerent agents use this discourse as a
strategic resource?
Third, ethics as practice does not focus purely
on the ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard, 1979) that
might support certain ways of conduct: it does
not simplify complex relations to simple dichoto-
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mies. It looks at practices that work on a micro-
level and may support paradoxically diﬀerent
ideologies. Scientiﬁc management, for instance
was embraced by capitalists in the 1910s, while it
was resisted by managers and workers at the
same time, welcomed by the Soviets in the 1920s,
re-embraced by the Japanese in the form of
Deming in the 1950s (see Deming 1994), prepar-
ing the way for TQM and, in the 1990s, it
underpinned the entrepreneurial revivalism of
business process re-engineering (Hammer and
Champy, 1993). Thus, it is not on an ideological
level that grand narratives compete for what is
good and evil, but on a level of concrete practices
in use, which is where ethics are at stake.
Fourth, every organization has a future-or-
iented, even utopian, element to it, a certain telos
associated with why it does what it strives to do.
Rather than focusing on those ultimate values
embodied in such discourse, and discussing
whether they are good or bad, ethics as practice
asks how these values came into being, and why
they should be ‘better’ than others. Research will
focus on how they are instrumentalized and made
to work in certain contexts, and what unantici-
pated consequences they might bring. The
discourse of empowerment, for instance, features
certain rights and a certain image of what human
beings are or should be but instead of judging
these idealized values, an approach to ethics as
practice will focus on the eﬀects and power
relations that this discourse constitutes. It asks
how ethics are enacted and through which stories
do newcomers learn their ethics? But also,
idealized discourse provides a template to evalu-
ate behaviour: which discourses dominate the
debate about ethical behaviour? How are ethics
perceived and evaluated in and through these?
Fifth, and lastly, an approach to ethics as
practice focuses on local events and refrains from
making universal claims such as ‘globalization is
bad because . . .’. It does not believe in a one-best
way solution nor does it see one big global
problem that would drive diverse local solutions.
Of course, globalization is a social reality, but it is
played out, utilized, understood and fought
about distinctly in diﬀerent regions by interests
that constitute themselves on the basis of such
diﬀerences: thus, globalization is a plural word
that needs to be analysed in speciﬁc circum-
stances. How does the global discourse on ethics
aﬀect local realities of organizational processes
related to human resource management, market-
ing, accounting and so forth? Putting emphasis
on the context and the embeddedness of ethics, it
is important to refrain from generalizing judge-
ments and focus on local meaning and sensemak-
ing practices that constitute ethics.
In summary, in this article we have elaborated
the value of understanding business ethics as a
form of practice. As we have shown, ethics
cannot be encapsulated in lists of rules that
inform action; thus, there can be no ‘one best
way’ in which good ethics may be guaranteed
through prescription, judgement or legislation.
The concept of ethics as practice cannot oﬀer a
clear black and white grid that divides the world
into good and bad; things are more complicated.
The approach recommended would encourage
innovative directions in both research and prac-
tice, enabling organizational members and theor-
ists to understand and manage better the diﬃcult
and diﬀuse ethical predicaments that they face.
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